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  APPENDIX A
 
  XVII. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biological Agents By The
    Intelligence Community
 
 Under its mandate [1] the Select Committee has studied the testing and use of chemical and
    biological agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed descriptions of the programs
    conducted by intelligence agencies involving chemical and biological agents will be
    included in a separately published appendix to the Senate Select Committee's report. This
    section of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their monitoring and
    control, and what the Committee's investigation has revealed about the relationships among
    the intelligence agencies and about their relations with other government agencies and
    private institutions and individuals. [2]
 
 Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and biological agents
    against Americans or America's allies led to the development of a defensive program
    designed to discover techniques for American intelligence agencies to detect and
    counteract chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became secondary
    as the possible use of these agents to obtain information from, or gain control over,
    enemy agents became apparent.
 
 Research and development programs to find materials which could be used to alter human
    behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. These experimental programs
    originally included testing of drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated in
    tests using unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to determine
    the potential effects of chemical or biological agents when used operationally against
    individuals unaware that they had received a drug.
 
 The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies
    administering them. Few people, even within the agencies, knew of the programs and there
    is no evidence that either the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of them.
    The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in part by an
    observation made by the CIA Inspector General that, "the knowledge that the Agency is
    engaging in unethical and illicit activi-
 
 
 
  [1] Senate Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select
    Committee on Intelligence Activities to investigate a number of issues:
 "(a) Whether agencies within the intelligence community conducted illegal domestic
    activities (Section 2 (1) and (2));
 "(b) The extent to which agencies within the intelligence community cooperate
    (Section 2 (4) and (8));
 "(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence
    activities (Section 2 (7) and (11));
 "(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens
    (Section 2 (13))."
 
 [2] The details of these programs may never be known. The programs were
    highly compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for the
    CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.
 
 
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 ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be
    detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions." [3]
 
 The research and development program, and particularly the covert testing programs,
    resulted in massive abridgments of the rights of American citizens, sometimes with tragic
    consequences The deaths of two Americans [3a] can be attributed to these programs; other
    participants in the testing programs may still suffer from the residual effects. While
    some controlled testing of these substances might be defended, the nature of the tests,
    their scale, and the fact that they were continued for years after the danger of
    surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a
    fundamental disregard for the value of human life.
 
 The Select Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chemical and biological
    agents also raise serious questions about the adequacy of command and control procedures
    within the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, and about the
    relationships among the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and private
    institutions and individuals. The CIA's normal administrative controls were waived for
    programs involving chemical and biological agents to protect their security. According to
    the head of the Audit Branchof the CIA, these waivers produced "gross administrative
    failures." They prevented the CIA's internal review mechanisms (the Office of General
    Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff) from adequately supervising the
    programs. In general, the waivers had the paradoxical effect of providing less restrictive
    administrative controls and less effective internal review for controversial and highly
    sensitive projects than those governing normal Agency activities.
 
 The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers of normal administrative
    controls, but also by a high degree of compartmentation within the CIA. This
    compartmentation excluded the CIA's Medical Staff from the principal research and testing
    program employing chemical and biological agents.
 
 It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing and inconsistent responses
    when they posed questions to the CIA component involved.
 
 Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by jurisdictional conflict among the
    various intelligence agencies. A spirit of cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of
    information which initially characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers
    withheld information from the CIA, ignoring suggestions for coordination from their
    superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information to the military on the CIA's
    testing program. This failure to cooperate was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by
    the Army to conceal
 
 
 
  [3] CIA Inspector General's Survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
 
 [3a] On January 8, 1953, Mr. Harold Blauer died of circulatory collapse
    and heart failure following an intravenous injection of a synthetic mescaline derivative
    while a subject of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under a
    contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee's investigation into drug
    testing by U.S. intelligence agencies focused on the testing of LSD, however, the
    committee did receive a copy of the U.S. Army Inspector General's Report, issued on
    October 1975, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Blauer's death. His death was
    directly attributable to the administration of the synthetic mescaline derivative.
 
  
  
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 their overseas testing program, which included surreptitious administration of LSD, from
    the CIA. Learning of the Army's program, the Agency surreptitiously attempted to gain
    details of it.
 
 The decision to institute one of the Army's LSD field testing projects had been based, at
    least in part, on the finding that no long-term residual effects had ever resulted from
    the drug's administration. The CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted
    from the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans may well have resulted
    in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal program.
 
 The development, testing, and use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence
    agencies raises serious questions about the relationship between the intelligence
    community and foreign governments, other agencies of the Federal Government, and other
    institutions and individuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy of American
    complicity in actions abroad which violate American and foreign laws to the possible
    compromise of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover by
    intelligence agencies.
 
 
 
 A. THE PROGRAMS INVESTIGATED
 
 1. Project CHATTER
 
 Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of 1947. Responding to reports
    of "amazing results" achieved by the Soviets in using "truth drugs,"
    the program focused on the identification and testing of such drugs for use in
    interrogations and in the recruitment of agents. The research included laboratory
    experiments on animals and human subjects involving Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine,
    and mescaline in order to determine their speech-inducing qualities. Overseas experiments
    were conducted as part of the project.
 
 The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and ended shortly after the war,
    in 1953.
 
 
 2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE
 
 The earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of chemical and biological
    agents, Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:
 
 
 
      (a)discovering means of conditioning personnel to
      prevent unauthorized extraction of information from them by known means, (b)
      investigating the possibility of control of an individual by application of special
      interrogation techniques, (c) memory enhancement, and (d)
      establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel. [4] As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project, another goal was
    added -- the evaluation of offensive uses of unconventional interrogation techniques,
    including hypnosis and drugs. In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Project
    ARTICHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation techniques, conducted "under
    medical and security controls which would ensure 
 
 
  [4] CIA memorandum to the Select Committee,
    "Behavioral Drugs and Testing," 2/11/75.
 
  
  
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 that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experiments. [5] Overseas
    interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium pentothal and hypnosis after physical and
    psychiatric examinations of the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.
 
 The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which studied scientific advances by hostile
    powers, initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE efforts. In 1952, overall responsibility for
    ARTICHOKE was transferred from OSI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO),
    predecessor to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Services and Medical
    Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would retain liaison function with other
    government agencies. [6] The change in leadership from an intelligence unit to an
    operating unit apparently reflected a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by
    hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes, of special
    interrogation techniques -- primarily hypnosis and truth serums.
 
 Representatives from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE met almost monthly to discuss
    their progress. These discussions included the planning of overseas interrogations [8] as
    well as further experimentation in the U.S.
 
 Information about project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953 is scarce. The CIA maintains
    that the project ended in 1956, but evidence suggests that Office of Security and Office
    of Medical Services use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for
    several years thereafter.
 
 
 3. MKNAOMI
 
 MKNAOMI was another major CIA program in this area. In 1967, the CIA summarized the
    purposes of MKNAOMI:
 
 (a) To provide for a covert support base to
    meet clandestine operational requirements.
 
 (b) To stockpile severely incapacitating
    and lethal materials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division].
 
 (c) To maintain in operational readiness
    special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials.
 
 (d) To provide for the required
    surveillance, testing, upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to assure
    absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational
    conditions. [9]
 
 Under an agreement reached with the Army in 1952, the Special Operations Division (SOD) at
    Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents
    and delivery
 
 
 
  [5] Memorandum from Robert Taylor, O/DD/P to the
    Assistant Deputy (Inspection and Security) and Chief of the Medical Staff, 3/22/52.
 
 [6] Memorandum from H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director, Scientific
    Intelligence, to the Deputy Director/Plans (DDP) "Project ARTICHOKE," 8/29/52.
 
 [8] "Progress Report, Project ARTICHOKE." 1/12/53.
 
 [9] Memorandum from Chief, TSD/Biological Branch to Chief, TSD
    "MKNAOMI: Funding. Objectives, and Accomplishments." 10/18/67, p. 1. For a
    fuller description of MKNAOMI and the relationship between CIA and SOD, see p. 360.
 
  
  
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 systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and facilities of the Army
    to develop biological weapons suited for CIA use.
 
 SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills containing several different
    biological agents which could remain potent for weeks or months. SOD developed a special
    gun for firing darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate a
    guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to consciousness when
    leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also
    physically transferred to CIA personnel biological agents in "bulk" form, and
    delivery devices, including some containing biological agents.
 
 In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use against humans, it also
    asked SOD to study use of biological agents against crops and animals. In its 1967
    memorandum, the CIA stated:
 
 Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against crops and causing
    severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under field conditions. This was
    accomplished in anticipation of a requirement which was later developed but was
    subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action. [9a]
 
 MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25,1969, President Nixon renounced the use of
    any form of biological weapons that kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of
    existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. On February 14, 1970, the President clarified
    the extent of his earlier order and indicated that toxins -- chemicals that are not living
    organisms but are produced by living organisms -- were considered biological weapons
    subject to his previous directive and were to be destroyed. Although instructed to
    relinquish control of material held for the CIA by SOD, a CIA scientist acquired
    approximately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick which were
    stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went undetected for five years. [10]
 
 
 4. MKULTRA
 
 MKULTRA was the principal CIA program involving the research and development of chemical
    and biological agents. It was "concerned with the research and development of
    chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine
    operations to control human behavior." [11]
 
 In January 1973, MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical Services Division personnel
    acting on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has
    testified, and former Director Helms has confirmed, that in ordering the records
    destroyed, Dr. Gottlieb was carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.
 
 MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms,
    to the DCI, outlining a special
 
 
 
  [9a] Ibid. p. 2.
 
 [10] Senate Select Committee, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vol. 1.
 
 [11] Memorandum from the CIA Inspector General to the Director, 7/26/63.
 
  
  
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 funding mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and development projects that studied
    the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior. The projects
    involved:
 
 Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials.
    This area involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support
    present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensive potential, the
    development of a comprehensive capability in this field of covert chemical and biological
    warfare gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential, thus enabling
    us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these
    techniques as we are. [12]
 
 MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the lines proposed by ADDP Helms.
 
 Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special funding mechanism was its
    extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General's survey of MKULTRA in 1963 noted the following
    reasons for this sensitivity:
 
 a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many
    authorities in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical, therefore the
    reputation of professional participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in
    jeopardy.
 
 b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the,
    original charter.
 
 c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and
    interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.
 
 d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce
    serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion. as well as stimulate offensive and
    defensive action in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services. [13]
 
 Over the ten-year life of the program, many "additional avenues to the control of
    human behavior" were designated as appropriate for investigation under the MKULTRA
    charter. These include "radiation, electroshock, various fields of psychology,
    psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and
    paramilitary devices and materials." [14]
 
 The research and development of materials to be used for altering human behavior consisted
    of three phases: first, the search for materials suitable for study; second, laboratory
    testing on voluntary human subjects in various types of institutions; third, the
    application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.
 
 The search for suitable materials was conducted through standing arrangements with
    specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal
    institutions, and private research organi-
 
 
 
  [12] Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53,
    Tab A, pp. 1-2. [13] I.G. Report on MKULTRA, 1963, pp. 1-2. [14]
    Ibid, p. 4.
 
  
  
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 zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were made under ostensible
    research foundation auspices, thereby concealing the CIA's interest from the specialist's
    institution.
 
 The next phase of the MKULTRA program involved physicians, toxicologists, and other
    specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals, and in prisons. Utilizing the
    products and findings of the basic research phase, they conducted intensive tests on human
    subjects.
 
 One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of Mental Health. This
    study was intended to test various drugs, including hallucinogenics, at the NIMH Addiction
    Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center,"
    as it was then called, was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug
    violations.
 
 The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking a brief physical examination
    and signing a general consent form, were administered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward
    for participation in the program, the addicts were provided with the drug of their
    addiction.
 
 LSD was one of the materials tested in the MKULTRA program. The final phase of LSD testing
    involved surreptitious administration to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life
    settings by undercover officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the CIA.
 
 The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials under accepted
    scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions
    that may occur in operational situations." [15]
 
 According to the CIA, the advantage of the relationship with the Bureau was that
 
 
 
      test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of
      narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or members of suspect criminal
      elements from whom the [Bureau of Narcotics] has obtained results of operational value
      through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on
      individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great
      significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these
      categories. [Emphasis added.] [16] 
 A special procedure, designated MKDELTA, was established to govern the use of MKULTRA
    materials abroad. Such materials were used on a number of occasions. Because MKULTRA
    records were destroyed, it is impossible to reconstruct the operational use of MKULTRA
    materials by the CIA overseas; it has been determined that the use of these materials
    abroad began in 1953, and possibly as early as 1950.
 
 Drugs were used primarily as an aid to interrogations, but MKULTRA/MKDELTA materials were
    also used for harassment, discrediting, or disabling purposes. According to an Inspector
    General Survey of the Technical Services Division of the CIA in 1957 -- an inspection
    which did not discover the MKULTRA project involving the surreptitious administration of
    LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer
 
 
 
  [15] Ibid, P. 21.
 
 [16] Ibid., pp. 11-12.
 
  
  
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 subjects -- the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and they had been used in
    six different operations on a total of thirty-three subjects. [17] By 1963 the number of
    operations and subjects had increased substantially.
 
 In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General survey of the Technical
    Services Division, a member of the Inspector General's staff, John Vance, learned about
    MKULTRA and about the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to
    unwitting, nonvoluntary human subjects. As a result of the discovery and the Inspector
    General's subsequent report, this testing was halted and much tighter administrative
    controls were imposed on the program. According to the CIA, the project was decreased
    significantly each budget year until its complete termination in the late 1960s.
 
 
 5. The Testing of LSD by the Army
 
 There were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In the first, LSD was
    administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers who volunteered to be subjects in
    chemical warfare experiments. In the second phase, Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95
    volunteers received LSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential
    intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT, 16
    unwitting nonvolunteer subjects were interrogated after receiving LSD as part of
    operational field tests.
 
 
 
 B. CIA DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS
 
 1. The Rationale for the Testing Programs
 
 The late 1910s and early 1950s were marked by concern over the threat posed by the
    activities of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other Communist bloc
    countries. United States concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these
    powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and biological agents
    in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill
    Allied personnel created considerable pressure for a "defensive" program to
    investigate chemical and biological agents so that the intelligence community could
    understand the mechanisms by which these substances worked and how their effects could be
    defeated. [18]
 
 Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had received reports that the Soviet Union
    was engaged in intensive efforts to produce LSD; and that the Soviet Union had attempted
    to purchase the world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeply involved
    in work with this drug described the climate of the times: "[It] is awfully hard in
    this day and age to reproduce how frightening all of this was to us at the time,
    particularly after the drug scene has become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this
    country as it did. But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that
    we
 
 
 
  [17] Ibid, 1957, p. 201.
 
 [18] Thus an officer in the Office of Security of the CIA stressed the
    "urgency of the discovery of techniques and method that would permit our personnel,
    in the event of their capture by the enemy, to resist or defeat enemy interrogation."
    (Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53.)
 
  
  
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 had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possibilities if used
    wrongly." [19]
 
 But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and biological agents were
    to be studied in order "to perfect techniques... for the abstraction of information
    from individuals whether willing or not" and in order to "develop means for the
    control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or
    not." [20] One Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to
    "gain control of bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of
    removing personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. [21] In other programs,
    the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, and maintain in operational readiness
    materials which could be used to harass, disable, or kill specific targets. [22]
 
 Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China,
    and the Communist Bloc countries provided the basis for the transmutation of American
    programs from a defensive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff
    of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 1952:
 
 
 
      There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable interrogations
      that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical duress, electric shock, and possibly
      hypnosis against their enemies. With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from
      becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this mounting evidence to
      assume a more aggressive role in the development of these techniques, but must be cautious
      to maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that could be wrought by such
      techniques in unscrupulous hands. [23] In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, substantial programs
    for the testing and use of chemical and biological agents -- including projects involving
    the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all
    social levels, high and low, native American and foreign" -- were conceived, and
    implemented. These programs resulted in substantial violations of the rights of
    individuals within the United States.
 
 
  [19] Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 33.
 
 [20] Memorandum from the Director of Security to ARTICHOKE
    representatives, Subject: "ARTICHOKE Restatement of Program."
 
 [21] ARTICHOKE memorandum, 7/30/53.
 
 [22] The Inspector General's Report of 1957 on the Technical Services
    Division noted that "Six specific products have been developed and are available for
    operational use. Three of them are discrediting and disabling materials which can be
    administered unwittingly and permit the exercise of a measure of control over the actions
    of the subject."
 
 A memorandum for the Chief, TSD, Biological Branch to the Chief, TSD, 10/18/67, described
    two of the objectives of the CIA's Project MKNAOMI as: "to stockpile severely
    incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of TSD and "to maintain in
    operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and
    chemical materials."
 
 [23] Memorandum from the Chief of the Medical Staff, 1/25/52.
 
  
  
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 Although the CIA recognized these effects of LSD to unwitting individuals within the
    United States, the project continued. As the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms,
    wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to tile
    cessation of unwitting testing:
 
 While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an
    individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency
    maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities the
    manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability. [25]
 
 There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial aspects of these
    programs from the executive branch or Congress. The nature and extent of the programs were
    closely held secrets; even DCI McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program
    involving the surreptitious administration of LSD until 1963. It was deemed imperative
    that these programs be concealed from the American people. As the CIA's Inspector General
    wrote in 1957:
 
 Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations from exposure to enemy forces but
    also to conceal these activities from the American public in general. The knowledge that
    the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious
    repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to the
    accomplishment of its mission. [26]
 
 
 2. The Death of Dr. Frank Olson
 
 The most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the death of Dr. Frank Olson,
    a civilian employee of the Army, who died on November 27, 1953. His death followed his
    participation in a CIA experiment with LSD. As part of this experiment, Olson unwittingly
    received approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau he drank on November
    19, 1953. The drug had been placed in the bottle by a CIA officer, Dr. Robert Lashbrook,
    as part of an experiment he and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a meeting of Army and CIA
    scientists.
 
 Shortly after this experiment, Olson exhibited symptoms of paranoia and schizophrenia.
    Accompanied by Dr. Lashbrook, Olson sought psychiatric assistance in New York City from a
    physician, Dr. Harold Abramson, whose research on LSD had been funded indirectly by the
    CIA. While in New York for treatment, Olson fell to his death from a tenth story window in
    the Statler Hotel.
 
 
 
  [24] Even during the discussions which led to the
    termination of the unwitting testing, the DDP turned down the option of halting such tests
    within the. U.S. and continuing them abroad despite the fact that the Technical Services
    Division had conducted numerous operations abroad making use of LSD. The DDP made this
    decision on the basis of security noting that the past efforts, overseas had resulted in
    "making an inordinate number of foreign nationals witting of our role in the very
    sensitive activity." (Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from
    the Deputy Director for Plans, 12/17/63, p. 2.)
 
 [25] Ibid., pp. 2-3.
 
 [26] I.G. survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
 
  
  
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 a. Background. -- Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assigned to the Special
    Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biological Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland.
    This Division had three primary functions:
 
 (1) assessing the vulnerability of American
    installations to biological attack;
 
 (2) developing techniques for offensive use
    of biological weapons; and
 
 (3) biological research for the CIA. [27]
 
 Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both the Army and the CIA.
    Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson's immediate superior at the time of his death, was in almost
    daily contact with Olson. According to Colonel Ruwet: "As a professional man... his
    ability... was outstanding." [28] Colonel Ruwet stated that "during the period
    prior to the experiment... I noticed nothing which would lead me to believe that he was of
    unsound mind." [29] Dr. Lashbrook, who had monthly contacts with Olson from early
    1952 until the time of his death, stated publicly that before Olson received LSD, "as
    far as I know, he was perfectly normal." [30] This assessment is in direct
    contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson's emotional stability made in CIA
    internal memorandum written after Olson's death.
 
 b. The Experiment. -- On November 18, 1953, a group of ten scientists from the CIA
    and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review and analysis conference at a cabin located
    at Deep Creek Lake, Maryland. Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical
    Services Staff. The Detrick representatives were all from the Special Operations Division.
 
 According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division participants "agreed
    that an unwitting experiment would be desirable." [31] This account directly
    contradicts Vincent Ruwet's recollection. Ruwet recalls no such discussion, and has
    asserted that he would remember any such discussion because the SOD participants would
    have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects. [32]
 
 In May, 1953, Richard Helms, Assistant DDP, held a staff meeting which the Chief of
    Technical Services Staff attended. At this meeting Helms "indicated that the drug
    [LSD] was dynamite and that he should be advised at all times when it was intended to use
    it." [33] In addition, the then DDP, Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSS stating
    the requirement that the DDP personally approve the use of LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with
    the experiment, [34] securing the ap-
 
 
 
  [27] Staff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, 8/13/75,
    p. 3.
 
 [28] Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It May Concern, no date,
    p. 2.
 
 [29] Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.
 
 [30] Joseph B. Treaster, New York Times, 7/19/75, p. 1.
 
 [31] Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick, 12/1/53, p. 1.
 
 [32] Ruwet (staff summary), 8/1.3/75, p. 6.
 
 [33] Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53.
 
 [34] Ibid. Dr. Gottleib has testified that he does not remember
    either the meeting with Helms nor the Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 16.)
 
  
  
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 proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor the DDP specifically
    authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olson participated. [35]
 
 According to Gottlieb, [36] " a "very small dose" of LSD was placed in a
    bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday, November 19. The drug was
    placed in the liqueur by Robert Lashbrook. All but two of tie SOD participants received
    LSD. One did not drink; the other had a heart condition. [37] About twenty minutes after
    they finished their Cointreau, Gottlieb informed the other participants that they had
    received LSD.
 
 Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment," he observed nothing
    unusual in Olson's behavior. [37a] Once the experiment was underway, Gottlieb recalled
    that "the drug had a definite effect on the group to the point that they were
    boisterous and laughing and they could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible
    conversation." The meeting continued until about 1: 00 a.m., when the participants
    retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others, complained of
    "wakefulness" during the night. [38] According to Gottlieb on Friday morning
    "aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observed nothing unusual in [Olson's]
    actions, conversation, or general behavior." [39] Ruwet recalls that Olson
    "appeared to be agitated" at breakfast, but that he "did not consider this
    to be abnormal under the circumstances." [40]
 
 c. The Treatment. -- The following Monday, November 23, Olson was waiting for Ruwet
    when he came in to work at 7:30 a.m. For the next two days Olson's friends and family
    attempted to reassure him and help him "snap out" of what appeared to be a
    serious depression. On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long con-
 
 
 
  [35] Dr. Gottlieb testified that "given the
    information we knew up to this time, and based on a lot of our own self-administration, we
    thought it was a fairly benign substance in terms of potential harm." This is in
    conflict not only with Mr. Helms' statement but also with material which had been supplied
    to the Technical Services Staff. In one long memorandum on current research with LSD which
    was supplied to TSD, Henry Beecher described the dangers involved with such research in a
    prophetic manner. "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothland came when I raised
    the question as to any accidents which had arisen from the use of LSD-25. He said in a
    very positive way, 'none.' As it turned out this answer could be called overly positive,
    for later on in the evening I was discussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl, Jr., a
    psychiatrist in Bleulera's Clinic in Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence.
    Stohl, when asked the same question, replied, 'yes,' and added spontaneously, 'there is a
    case Professor Rothland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who had been subject to
    depression to some extent took LSD-25 in an experiment and became severely and suddenly
    depressed and committed suicide three weeks later. While the connection is not definite,
    common knowledge of this could hardly have allowed the positive statement Rothland
    permitted himself. This case is a warning to us to avoid engaging subjects who are
    depressed, or who have been subject to depression.'" Dr. Gottlieb testified that he
    had no recollection of either the report or that particular section of it. (Sidney
    Gottlieb testimony, 10/19/75, p. 78.)
 
 [36] Memorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the record, 11/28/53, p. 2.
 
 [37] Lashbrook (staff summary), 7/19/75, p. 3.
 
 [37a] Gottlieb Memorandum, 12/7/53. p. 2.
 
 [38] Edwards memorandum, 11/28/53, p. 3.
 
 [39] Gottlieb memorandum. 12/7/53, p. 3.
 
 [40] Ruwet memorandum, p. 3.
 
  
  
 -77-
 
 
 versation, it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson was desirable. [41]
 
 Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson was in serious trouble
    and needed immediate professional attention." [42] Lashbrook agreed to make
    appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson
    proceeded to Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York at about
    2:30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.
 
 At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist practicing medicine in New
    York City. He held no degree in psychiatry, but was associated with research projects
    supported indirectly by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely
    in the early 1950s. [43] Since Olson needed medical help, they turned to Dr. Abramson as
    the doctor closest to Washington who was experienced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.
 
 Ruwet, Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days of consultations with
    Abramson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, the three flew back to Washington so that Olson
    could spend Thanksgiving with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that
    he was afraid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that Olson
    and Lashbrook would return to New York, and that Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain
    these events to Mrs. Olson. [44]
 
 Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again for consultations with
    Abramson. They spent Thursday night in a Long Island hotel and the next morning returned
    to the city with Abramson. In further discussions with Abramson, it was agreed that Olson
    should be placed under regular psychiatric care at an institution closer to his home. [45]
 
 d. The Death. -- Because they could not obtain air transportation for a return trip
    on Friday night, Lashbrook and Olson made reservations for Saturday morning and checked
    into the Statler Hotel. Between the time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched
    television, visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner.
    According to Lashbrook, Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy the
    entertainment." He "appeared no longer particularly depressed, and almost the
    Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment." [46]
 
 After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about an hour, and at 11:00, Olson
    suggested that they go to bed, saying that "he felt more relaxed and contented than
    he had since [they] came to New York." [47] Olson then left a call with the hotel
    operator to wake them in the morning. At approximately 2:30 a.m. Saturday, November 28.
    Lashbrook was awakened by a loud "crash of glass." In his report on the
    incident, he stated only that Olson "had crashed through the closed window blind and
    the closed window and he fell to his death from the window of our room on the 10th
    floor." [48]
 
 
 
  [41] Ibid., p. 4.
 [42] Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 1.
 [43] Staff summary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2.
 [44] Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, P. 3.
 [45] Abramson memorandum, 12/4/53.
 [46] Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 3.
 [47] Ibid., p. 4.
 [48] Ibid.
 
  
  
 -78-
 
 
 Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lashbrook telephoned Gottlieb
    at his home and informed him of the incident. [49] Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him
    of Olson's death at approximately 2:45 a.m. [50] Lashbrook then called the hotel desk and
    reported the incident to the operator there. Lashbrook called Abramson and informed him of
    the occurrence. Abramson told Lashbrook he "wanted to be kept out of the thing
    completely," but later changed his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook. [51]
 
 Shortly thereafter, uniformed police officers and some hotel employees came to Lashbrook's
    room. Lashbrook told the police he didn't know why Olson had committed suicide, but he did
    know that Olson "suffered from ulcers." [52]
 
 e. The Aftermath. -- Following Dr. Olson's death, the CIA made a substantial effort
    to ensure that his family received death benefits, but did not notify the Olsons of the
    circumstances surrounding his demise. The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent
    the death being connected with the CIA, and supplied complete cover for Lashbrook so that
    his association with the CIA would remain a secret.
 
 After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investigation of the incident. As
    part of his responsibilities in this investigation, the General Counsel wrote the
    Inspector General, stating:
 
 I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude on the part of TSS
    representatives to the way this experiment was conducted and the remarks that this is just
    one of the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not eliminate the need for
    taking risks, but I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake, that at
    least the prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to minimize the risk must be
    taken and failure to do so was culpable negligence. The actions of the various individuals
    concerned after effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifest also revealed the
    failure to observe normal and reasonable precautions. [53]
 
 As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal letter to the Chief of
    Technical Operations of the Technical Services Staff who had approved the experiment
    criticizing him for "poor judgment... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an
    unwitting basis and without proximate medical safeguards." [54] Dulles also sent a
    letter to Dr. Gottlieb, Chief of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff,
    criticizing him for recommending the "unwitting application of the drug" in that
    the proposal "did not give sufficient emphasis for medical collaboration and for the
    proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being
    administered." [55]
 
 
 
  [49] CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
 [50] Ruwet Memorandum, p. 11.
 [51] CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
 [52] Ibid.
 [53] Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Inspector General.
    1/4/54.
 [54] Memorandum from DCI to Chief, Technical Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
 [55] Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54.
 
  
  
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 The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read and returned. Although the
    letters were critical, a note from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to Mr.
    Helms instructed him to inform the individuals that: "These are not reprimands and no
    personnel file notation are being made." [56]
 
 Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them as such, these notes were
    explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participation in the events which led to Dr. Olson's
    death have any apparent effect on the advancement within the CIA of the individuals
    involved.
 
 
 3. The Surreptitious Administration of LSD to Unwitting NonVolunteer Human Subjects by
    the CIA After the Death of Dr. Olson
 
 The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as some argued at the time, as a tragic accident,
    one of the risks inherent in the testing of new substances. It might be argued that LSD
    was thought to be benign. After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious
    administration of LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued or initiated [57] a project
    involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to nonvolunteer human subjects. This
    program exposed numerous individuals in the United States to the risk of death or serious
    injury without their informed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessary
    follow-up to determine any long-term effects.
 
 Prior to the Olson experiment, the Director of Central Intelligence had approved MKULTRA,
    a research program designed to develop a "capability in the covert use of biological
    and chemical agent materials." In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms, then
    ADDP, wrote the Director that:
 
 
 
      we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which
      causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be
      reasonably well predicted for each individual. This material 'could potentially aid in
      discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implanting suggestions and other
      forms of mental control. [58] On February 12, 1954, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote TSS
    officials criticizing them for "poor judgment" in administering LSD on "an
    unwitting basis and without proximate medical safeguards" to Dr. Olson and for the
    lack of "proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being
    administered." [59] On the same day, the Inspector General reviewed a report on
    Subproject Number 3 of MKULTRA, in which the same TSS officers who had just received
    letters from the Director were quoted as stating that one of the purposes of Subproject
    Number 3 was to
 
 
  [56] Note from DDCI to Richard Helms, 2/13/54.
 [57] The 1963 IG Report, which described the project involving the
    surreptitious administration of LSD, placed the project beginning In 1955. Other CIA
    documents reveal that it was in existence as early as February 1954. The CIA has told the
    Committee that the project began in 1953 and that the experiment which led to Dr. Olson's
    death was part of the project.
 [58] Memorandum from ADDP items to DOI Dulles, 4/3/53, tab A, p. 2.
 [59] Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54; and memorandum from
    DCI to Chief of operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
 
  
  
 -80-
 
 
 "observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after having been given a
    drug." [60] There is no evidence that Subproject Number 3 was terminated even though
    the officers were unequivocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration
    of LSD and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical safeguards.
    Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methods which showed even less concern than did the
    OLSON experiment for the safety and security of the participants. Yet the evidence
    indicates the project continued until 1963. [61]
 
 In the project, the individual conducting the test might make initial contact with a
    prospective subject selected at random in a bar. He would then invite the person to a
    "safehouse" where the test drug was administered to the subject through drink or
    in food. CIA personnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe the
    test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining room.
 
 Prior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects. There was also,
    obviously, no medical prescreening. In addition, the tests were conducted by individuals
    who were not qualified scientific observers. There were no medical personnel on hand
    either to administer the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was conducted
    on the test subjects.
 
 As the Inspector General noted in 1963:
 
 
 
      A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the
      infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results. The [individuals conducting
      the test] are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible
      beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery
      techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution,
      and side-effect. [62] This was particularly troublesome as in a
 
 
      number of instances,... the test subject has become ill for hours or
      days, including hospitalization in at least one case, and the agent could only follow up
      by guarded inquiry after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness and
      attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects of the testing. [61] Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the safety of foreign
    nationals against whom LSD was used abroad. In several cases medical examinations were
    performed prior to the use of LSD. [64]
 
 
  [60] Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief,
    Inspection and Review, on Subproject #3 of MKULTRA, 2/10/54.
 [61] IG Report on MKULTRA, 1903.
 [62] Ibid., p. 12.
 [63] Ibid. According to the IG's survey in 1963, physicians
    associated with MKULTRA could be made available in an emergency.
 [64] The Technical Services Division which was responsible for the
    operational use of LSD abroad took the position that "no physical examination of the
    subject is required prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A physician
    need not be present. There is no danger medically in the use of this material as handled
    by TSS trained personnel." The Office of Medical Services had taken the position that
    LSD was "medically dangerous." Both the Office of Security and the Office of
    Medical Services argued that LSD "should not be administered unless preceded by a
    medical examination... and should be administered only by or in the presence of a
    physician who had studied it and its effect." (Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief,
    Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Operations, 12/12/57, pp. 1-2.
 
  
  
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 Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant observation made possible
    because the material was being used against prisoners of foreign intelligence or security
    organizations. Finally, during certain of the LSD interrogations abroad, local physicians
    were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD and would not be told
    that hallucinogens had been administered. [65]
 
 The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting human
    subjects in the United States was finally halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery
    during the course of an Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division. When
    the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to the Deputy Director for Plans,
    who agreed that the Director should be briefed. The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his
    Deputy were generally familiar with MKULTRA. He indicated, however, that he was not sure
    it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point.
 
 On May 24,1963, the DDP advised the Inspector General that he had briefed the Director on
    the MKULTRA program and in particular had covered the question of the surreptitious
    administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector General, the
    DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the testing will
    continue." [66]
 
 One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was prepared by the Inspector
    General who recommended the termination of the surreptitious administration project. The
    project was suspended following the Inspector General's report.
 
 On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a memo to the DDCI, who with
    the Inspector General and the Executive Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert
    testing. He noted two aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine
    Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing human
    behavior;" and (2) "testing arrangements in furtherance of this mission should
    be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable as possible." Helms argued that
    the individuals must be "unwitting" as this was "the only realistic method
    of maintaining the capability, considering the intended operational use of materials to
    influence human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting. Should
    the subjects of the testing not be unwitting, the program would only be "pro
    forma" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and readiness." [67]
    Helms continued:
 
 
 
  [65] Physicians might be called with the hope that they
    would make a diagnosis of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting the
    individual who was the subject of the CIA interest.
 
 [66] Memorandum for the Record prepared by the Inspector General,
    5/15/63, p. 1.
 
 [67] Ibid., p. 2.
 
  
  
 -82-
 
 
 If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this unusual capability and the
    necessity for unwitting testing, there is only then the question of how best to do it.
    Obviously, the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit the opportunity
    to observe the results of the administration on the target. It also goes without saying
    that whatever testing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards for the
    protection of the Agency's role in this activity, as well as minimizing the possibility of
    physical or emotional damage to the individual tested. [68]
 
 In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June, 1964, Helms again raised
    the issue of unwitting testing. At that time General Carter, then acting DCI, approved
    several changes in the MKULTRA program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotiations
    between the Inspector General and the DDP. In a handwritten note, however, Director Carter
    added that "unwitting testing will be subject to a separate decision." [69]
 
 No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had been halted and,
    according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to DCI McCone, the DCI was not inclined to
    take the positive step of authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the
    summer, the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964, the DDP raised the issue
    again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's attention to what he described as
    "several other indications during the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness
    in the field of covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable
    and disturbing." [70]
 
 Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing, the Agency's "positive
    operational capability to use drugs is diminishing, owing to a lack of realistic testing.
    With increasing knowledge of the state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with
    Soviet advances in this field. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part to
    restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from
    pursuing operations in this area." [71]
 
 Helms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high risk of embarrassment
    to the Agency as well as the "moral problem." He noted that no better covert
    situation had been devised than that which had been used, and that "we have no answer
    to the moral issue." [72]
 
 Helms asked for either resumption of the testing project or its definitive cancellation.
    He argued that the status quo of a research and development program without a realistic
    testing program was causing the Agency to live "with the illusion of a capability
    which is becoming minimal and furthermore is expensive." [73] Once again no formal
    action was taken in response to the Helms' request.
 
 
 
  [68] Memorandum from DDP Helms to DDCI Carter, 12/17/63.
 [69] Memorandum from DDP Helms to DCI, 6/9/64, p. 3.
 [70] Ibid., 11/9/64, p. 1.
 [71] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
 [72] Ibid., p. 2.
 [73] Ibid.
 
  
  
 -83-
 
 
 From its beginning in the early 1950's until its termination in 1963, the program of
    surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer human subjects demonstrates
    a failure of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals
    and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that the testing
    was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were ignored
    during the ten years of testing which followed Dr. Olson's death. Although it was clear
    that the laws of the United States were being violated, the testing continued. While the
    individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished by the Director, at the same
    time they were also told that they were not being reprimanded and that their "bad
    judgment" would not be made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing
    project was terminated in 1963, none of the individuals involved were subject to any
    disciplinary action.
 
 
 4. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents by
    the CIA
 
 The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring and control of the testing
    and use of chemical and biological agents within the CIA. [74] An analysis of the failures
    can be divided into four sections: (a) the waiver of normal regulations
    or requirements; (b) the problems in authorization procedures; (c)
    the failure of internal review mechanisms such as the Office of General Counsel, the
    Inspector General, and the Audit Staff; and (d) the effect of
    compartmentation and competition within the CIA.
 
 a. The Waiver of Administrative Controls. -- The internal controls within any
    agency rest on: (1) clear and coherent regulations; (2) clear lines of authority; and (3)
    clear rewards for those who conduct themselves in accord with agency regulations and
    understandable and immediate sanctions against those who do not. In the case of the
    testing and use of chemical and biological agents, normal CIA administrative controls were
    waived. The destruction of the documents on the largest CIA program in this area
    constituted a prominent example of the waiver of normal Agency procedures by the Director.
 
 These documents were destroyed in early 1973 at the order of then DCI Richard Helms.
    According to Helms, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, then Director of TSD:
 
 
 
      ... came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was retiring
      and he thought it would be a good idea if these files were destroyed. And I also believe
      part of the reason for our thinking this was advisable was there had been relationships
      with outsiders in government agencies and other organizations and that these would be
      sensitive in this kind of a thing but that since the program was over and finished and
      done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as 
  [74] Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee
    to examine: the "extent to which United States intelligence agencies are governed by
    Executive Orders, rules, or regulations either published or secret."
 
  
  
 -84-
 
 
 
 
      well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not be subject
      to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you will. [75] The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation, CSI 70-10, which
    regulated the "retirement of inactive records." As Thomas Karamessines, then
    Deputy Director of Plans, wrote in regulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter
    of convenience or of storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rules
    modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of this judgment is to
    ensure that the complete story can be reconstructed in later years and by people who may
    be unfamiliar with the events." [76]
 The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible for the Select Committee to
    determine the full range and extent of the largest CIA research program involving chemical
    and biological agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating and providing
    medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the program. Finally, it
    prevented the Committee from determining the full extent of the operations which made use
    of materials developed in the MKULTRA program. [77]
 
 From the inception of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were waived. In 1953, Mr. Helms,
    then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, proposed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the
    proposal six percent of the research and development budget of TSD would be expended
    "without the establishment of formal contractual relations" because contracts
    would reveal government interest. Helms also voted that qualified individuals in the field
    "are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which connect them
    with this activity since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa-
 
 
 
  [75] Richard Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 5.
 
 Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with individuals and
    organizations are retained without public disclosure. Moreover, in the case of MKULTRA the
    CIA had spent millions of dollars developing both materials and delivery systems which
    could be used by the Clandestine Services; the reconstruction of the research and
    development program would be difficult if not impossible, without the documents, and at
    least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested against the document destruction on those
    grounds.
 
 [76] Clandestine Services Institution (CSI) 70-10. When asked by the
    Select Committee about the regularity of the procedure by which he authorized Dr. Gottlieb
    to destroy the MKULTRA records, Helms responded:
 
 "Well, that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular procedure or not,
    because the record destruction program is conducted according to a certain pattern.
    There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored by certain people and
    done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose, would have been unusual.
    In other words, there were documents being destroyed because somebody had raised this
    specific issue rather than because they were encompassed in the regular records
    destruction program. So I think the answer to your question is probably yes." (Helms
    testimony, 9/11/75, p. 6.)
 
 [77] Even prior to the destruction of documents, the MKULTRA records were
    far from complete. As the Inspector General noted in 1963:
 
 "Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements
    that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substantial portion of the
    MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore
    almost certain to be lost with their departures." (IG Report on MKULTRA, p. 23.)
 
  
  
 -85-
 
 
 tions". [78] Other Agency procedures, i.e., the forwarding of document, in support of
    invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures, were also to be waived. On April
    13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles approved MKULTRA, noting that security considerations
    precluded handling the project through usual contractual agreements.
 
 Ten years later investigations of MKULTRA by both the Inspector General and the Audit
    Staff noted substantial deficiencies which resulted from the waivers. Because TSD had not
    reserved the right to audit the books of contractors in MKULTRA, the CIA had been unable
    to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another firm had failed to establish
    controls and safeguards which would assure "proper accountability" in use of
    government funds with the result that "funds have been used for purposes not
    contemplated by grants or allowable under usual contract relationship." [79] The
    entire MKULTRA arrangement was condemned for having administrative lines which were
    unclear, overly permissive controls, and irresponsible supervision.
 
 The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits: led us to see MKULTRA as
    frequently having provided a device to escape normal administrative controls for research
    that is not especially sensitive, as having allowed practices that produce gross
    administrative failures, as having permitted the establishment of special relationships
    with unreliable organizations on an unacceptable basis, and as having produced, on at
    least one occasion, a. cavalier treatment of a bona fide contracting organization.
 
 While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanisms for handling sensitive
    projects, the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote that "both the terms of reference and
    the ground rules for handling such special projects should be spelled out in advance so
    that diversion from normal channels does not mean abandonment of controls.
 
 Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highly sensitive operations.
    To prevent the erosion of normal internal control mechanisms, such waivers should not be
    extended to less sensitive operations. Moreover, only those regulations which would
    endanger security should be waived; to waive regulations generally would result in highly
    sensitive and controversial projects having looser rather than stricter administrative
    controls. MKNAOMI, the Fort Detrick CIA project for research and development of chemical
    and biological agents, provides another example where efforts to protect the security of
    agency activities overwhelmed administrative controls. No written records of the transfer
    of agents such as anthrax or shellfish toxin were kept, "because of the sensitivity
    of the area and the desire to keep any possible use of materials like this
    recordless." [81] The
 
 
 
  [78] Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53,
    Tab. A, p. 2.
 
 [79] Memorandum from IG to Chief, TSD, 11/8/63, as quoted in memorandum
    from Chief, Audit Branch.
 
 [80] The memorandum suggested that administrative exclusions, because of
    the importance of such decisions, should require the personal approval of the Deputy
    Director of Central Intelligence on an individual case basis. Present CIA policy is that
    only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.
 
 [81] Sidney Gottlieb testimony, 10/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 51.
 
  
  
 -86-
 
 
 result was that the Agency had no way of determining what materials were on hand, and
    could not be certain whether delivery systems such as dart guns, or deadly substances such
    as cobra venom had been issued to the field.
 
 b. Authorization. -- The destruction of the documents regarding MKULTRA made it
    difficult to determine at what level specific projects in the program were authorized.
    This problem is not solely a result of the document destruction, however. Even at the
    height of MKULTRA the IG noted that, at least with respect to the surreptitious
    administration of LSD, the "present practice is to maintain no records of the
    planning and approval of test programs." [82]
 
 While it is clear that Allen Dulles authorized MKULTRA, the record is unclear as to who
    authorized specific projects such as that involving the surreptitious administration of
    LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer human subjects. Even given the sensitive and controversial
    nature of the project, there is no evidence that when John McCone replaced Allen Dulles as
    the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency he was briefed on the details of this
    project and asked whether it should be continued . [83] Even during the 1963 discussions
    on the propriety of unwitting testing, the DDP questioned whether it was "necessary
    to brief General Carter", the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the
    Director's "alter ago," because CIA officers felt it necessary to keep details
    of the project restricted to an absolute minimum number of people. [84]
 
 In May of 1963, DDP Helms told the Inspector General that the covert testing program was
    authorized because he had gone to the Director, briefed him on it and "the Director
    indicated no disagreement and therefore the testing will continue." [85] Such
    authorization even for noncontroversial matters is clearly less desirable than explicit
    authorization; in areas such as the surreptitious administration of drugs, it is
    particularly undesirable. Yet according to testimony
 
 
 
  [82] IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963, p. 14.
 
 [83] According to an assistant to Dr. Gottlieb, there were annual
    briefings of the DCI and the DDP on MKULTRA by the Chief of TSD or his deputy. However, a
    Nay 15, 1963 Memorandum for the Record from the Inspector General noted that Mr. McCone
    had not been briefed in detail about the program. Mr. McCone's Executive Officer, Walter
    Elder, testified that it was "perfectly apparent to me" that neither Mr. McCone
    nor General Carter, then the DDCI, was aware of the surreptitious administration project
    "or if they had been briefed they had not understood it." (Elder, 12/18/75, p.
    13.) Mr. McCone testified that lie "did not know" whether he talked to anyone
    about the project but that no one had told him about it in a way that "would have
    turned on all the lights." (John McCone testimony, 2/3/76, p. 10.)
 
 [84] According to Elder's testimony, "no Deputy Director, to my
    knowledge, has ever been briefed or was it ever thought necessary to brief them to the
    extent to which you would brief the Director."
 
 [85] IG Memorandum for the Record. 5/15/63.
 
 On the question of authorization of the covert testing program, Elder testified as
    follows:
 
 "But my reasonable judgment is that this was considered to be in the area of
    continuing approval, having once been approved by the Director."
 
 The theory of authorization carrying over from one administration to the next seems
    particularly inappropriate for less visible, highly sensitive operations which, unless
    brought to his attention by subordinates, would not come to the attention of the Director.
 
  
  
 -87-
 
 
 before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement is even more prevalent in
    sensitive situations. [86]
 
 The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon and his subordinates,
    in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have resulted from the failure of the
    Director to issue written instructions to Agency officials. The retention was not
    authorized by senior officials in the Agency. The Director, Mr. Helms, had instructed Mr.
    Karamessines, the Deputy Director of Plans, and Dr. Gottlieb, the Chief of Technical
    Services Division, to relinquish control to the Army of any chemical or biological agents
    being retained for the CIA at Fort Detrick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this instruction on to Dr.
    Gordon. While orders may be disregarded in any organization, one of the reasons that Dr.
    Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not received written
    instructions forbidding it. [87]
 
 In some situations the existence of written instructions did not prevent unauthorized
    actions. According to an investigation by the CIA's Inspector General TSD officers had
    been informed orally that Mr. Helms was to be "advised at all times" when
    LSD was to be used. In addition TSD had received a memo advising the staff that LSD was
    not to be used without the permission of the DDP, Frank Wisner. The experiment involving
    Dr. Olson went ahead without notification of either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms. The absence
    of clear and immediate punishment for that act must undercut the force of other internal
    instructions and regulations.
 
 One last issue must be raised about authorization procedures within the Agency. Chemical
    agents were used abroad until 1959 for discrediting or disabling operations, or for the
    purpose of interrogations with the approval of the Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later
    the approval of the Deputy Director for Plans was required for such operations. Although
    the medical staff sought to be part of the approval process for these operations, they
    were excluded because, as the Inspector General wrote in 1957:
 
 Operational determinations are the responsibility of the DDP and it is he who should
    advise the DCI in these respects just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It
    is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief Medical Staff, (what, in
    effect, would be authority over clandestine operations.) [88]
 
 Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the Medical Staff might
    well have been useful.
 
 Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those, agencies which assisted the
    CIA. For instance, the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to
    unwitting non-volunteer human subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of
    Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. There is some question as to the Commissioner of Narcotics'
    knowledge about the project.
 
 
 
  [86] Mr. Elder was asked whether the process of bringing
    forward a description of actions by the Agency in getting approval through the absence of
    disagreement was a common one. He responded, "It was not uncommon.... The more
    sensitive the project the more likely it would lean toward being a common practice, based
    on the need to keep the written record to a minimum."
 
 [87] Nathan Gordan testimony, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vol. 1.
 
 [88] 1957 IG Report.
 
  
  
 -88-
 
 
 In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD had been briefed about the
    project, but the IG's report did not indicate the level of detail provided to him. Dr.
    Gottlieb testified that "I remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling
    that he was aware." [89] Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of testing
    on unwitting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Commissioner Anslinger.
 
 In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that Harry Giordano, who
    replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that when he became Commissioner he was
    "only generally briefed on the arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said
    he didn't want to know the details." The same memorandum states, however, that there
    were several comments which indicated to Dr. Gottlieb that Mr. Giordano was aware of the
    substance of the project. It is possible that the Commissioner provided a general
    authorization for the arrangement without understanding what it entailed or considering
    its propriety. A reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and the CIA's
    hesitancy to volunteer it, has been found in a number of instances during the Select
    Committee's investigations. This problem is not confined to the executive branch but has
    also marked congressional relationships with the Agency.
 
 c. Internal Review. -- The waiver of regulations and the absence of documentation
    make it difficult to determine now who authorized which activities. More importantly, they
    made internal Agency review mechanisms much less effective. [90] Controversial and highly
    sensitive projects which should have been subject to the most rigorous inspection lacked
    effective internal review.
 
 Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the surreptitious administration
    of LSD to Dr. Olson, it would have seemed likely that he would be asked about the legality
    or propriety of any subsequent projects involving such administration. This was not done.
    He did not learn about this testing until the 1970's. Nor was the General Counsel's
    opinion sought on other MKULTRA projects, though these had been characterized by the
    Inspector General in the 1957 Report on TSD as "unethical and illicit." [91]
 
 There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's survey of TSD of the
    project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD. That project was apparently not
    brought to the attention of the survey team. The Inspector who discovered it during the
    IG's 1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,
 
 
 
  [89] Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 28.
 
 [90] The IG's report on MKULTRA in 1963 stated:
 
 "The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting control of
    MKULTRA activities. in so doing, however, TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum
    documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some of the projects. Some files
    were found to present a reasonably complete record, including most sensitive matters,
    while others with parallel objectives contained little or no data at all. The lack of
    consistent records precluded use of routine inspection procedures and raised a variety of
    questions concerning management and fiscal controls."
 
 [91] CIA, Inspector General's report on TSD, 1957, p. 217.
 
  
  
 -89-
 
 
 rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially sensitive project.
    [92]
 
 Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the principal internal mechanisms
    for the control of possibly improper actions, were excluded from regular reviews of the
    project. When the project was discovered the Executive Director Comptroller voiced strong
    opposition to it; it is possible that the project would have been terminated in 1957 if it
    had been called to his attention when he then served as Inspector General.
 
 The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function through the examination of
    Agency expenditures, also encountered substantial difficulty with MKULTRA. When MKULTRA
    was first proposed the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This was soon
    changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual procedures" in MKULTRA
    increased the likelihood of "irregularities" as well as the difficulty in
    detecting them. The head of the Audit Branch characterized the MKULTRA procedures as
    "having allowed practices that produced gross administrative failures,"
    including a lack of controls within outside contractors which would "assure proper
    accountability in use of government funds." It also diminished the CIA's capacity to
    verify the accountings provided by outside firms.
 
 d. Compartmentation and Jurisdictional Conflict Within the Agency. -- As has been
    noted, the testing and use of chemical and biological agents was treated as a highly
    sensitive activity within the CIA. This resulted in a high degree of compartmentation. At
    the same time substantial jurisdictional conflict existed within the Agency between the
    Technical Services Division, and the Office of Medical Services and the Office of
    Security.
 
 This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have led to duplication of
    effort within the CIA and to Agency policymakers being deprived of useful information.
 
 During the early 1950's first the BLUEBIRD Committee and then the ARTICHOKE Committee were
    instituted to bring together representatives of the Agency components which had a
    legitimate interest in the area of the alteration of human behavior. By 1957 both these
    committees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the Technical Services Division
    (a component supposedly represented on the ARTICHOKE Committee) about ARTICHOKE operations
    being conducted by the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services. The
    Technical Services Division which was providing support to the Clandestine Services in the
    use of chemical and biological agents, but provided little or no information to either the
    Office of Security or the Office of Medical Services. As one TSD officer involved in these
    programs testified: "Although we were acquainted, we certainly didn't share
    experiences." [93]
 
 
 
  [92] Even after the Inspector came upon it the IG did not
    perform a complete investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an extensive
    survey of TSD and the Inspector was in the process of being transferred to another post
    within the Agency.
 
 [93] Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 14.
 
  
  
 -90-
 
 
 QKHILLTOP, another group designed to coordinate research in this area also had little
    success. The group met infrequently -- only twice a year -- and little specific
    information was exchanged. [94]
 
 Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure to share information, [95]
    but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD officer stated that the Office, of
    Medical Services simply wasn't "particularly interested in what we were doing"
    and never sought such information. [96] On the other hand, a representative of the Office
    of Medical Services consistently sought to have medical personnel participate in the use
    of chemical and biological agents suggested that TSD did not inform the Office of Medical
    Services in order to prevent their involvement.
 
 Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office of Security, which had been
    assigned responsibility for direction of ARTICHOKE, consistently sought to bring TSD
    operations involving psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The Office of Medical
    Services sought to have OMS physicians advise and participate in the operational use of
    drugs. As the Inspector General described it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned
    with the extent of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over
    the activities of TSD which encroach upon or enter into the medical field," and which
    are conducted by TSD "without seeking the prior approval of the Chief, Medical Staff,
    and often without informing him of their nature and extent." [91]
 
 As was noted previously, because the projects and programs of TSD stemmed directly from
    operational needs controlled by the DDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of
    these activities by the Medical Staff:
 
 It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief, Medical Staff, what, in
    effect, would be authority over clandestine operations. Furthermore, some of the
    activities of Chemical Division are not only unorthodox but unethical and sometimes
    illegal. The DDP is in a better position to evaluate the justification for such operations
    than the Chief, Medical Staff. [98] [Emphasis added.]
 
 Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for "evaluating the risks
    involved" in the programs and because the knowledge that the CIA was "engaging
    in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and
    diplomatic circles," the IG recommended that the Director of Security be fully
    advised of TSD's activities in these areas.
 
 Even after the Inspector General's Report of 1957, the compartmentation and jurisdictional
    conflict continued. They may have had a sub-
 
 
 
  [94] The one set of minutes from a QKHILLTOP meeting
    indicated that individuals in the Office of Medical Services stressed the need for more
    contact.
 
 [95] When asked why information on the surreptitious administration of
    LSD was not presented to the ARTICHOKE committee, Dr. Gottlieb responded: "I imagine
    the only reason would have been a concern for broadening the awareness of its
    existence."
 
 [96] CIA Officer, 11/21/75, p. 14
 
 [97] IG Survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
 
 [98] Ibid.
 
  
  
 -91-
 
 
 stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Agency. As the Deputy Chief of the
    Counterintelligence Staff noted in 1958, due to the different positions taken by TSS, the
    Office of Security, and the Office of Medical Services, on the use of chemical or
    biological agents, it was possible that the individual who authorized the use of a
    chemical or biological agent could be presented with "incomplete facts upon which to
    make a decision relevant to its use." Even a committee set up by the DDP in 1958 to
    attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have access to records of testing and use.
    This was due, in part, to excessive compartmentation, and jurisdictional conflict.
 
 
 
 C. Covert Testing On Human Subjects By Military Intelligence
    Groups: Material Testing Program EA 1729, Project Third Change, and Project Derby Hat
 
 EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program for lysergic acid
    diethylamide (LSD). Interest in LSD was originally aroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare
    Laboratories by open literature on the unusual effects of the compound. [99] The positive
    intelligence and counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like LSD, and
    suspected Soviet interest in such materials, [100] supported the development of an
    American military capability and resulted in experiments conducted jointly by the U.S.
    Army Intelligence Board and the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.
 
 These experiments, designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of LSD, were known
    collectively as "Material Testing Program EA 1729." Two projects of particular
    interest conducted as part of these experiments, "THIRD CHANCE" and "DERBY
    HAT", involved the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in Europe and the Far
    East.
 
 In many respects, the Army's testing programs duplicated research which had already been
    conducted by the CIA. They certainly involved the risks inherent in the early phases of
    drug testing. In the Army's tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights were also
    subordinated to national security considerations; informed consent and followup
    examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the secrecy of the tests.
    Finally, the command and control problems which were apparent in the CIA's programs are
    paralleled by a lack of clear authorization and supervision in the Army's programs.
 
 
 
  [99] USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program,
    EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 4.
 
 [100] This same USAINTC study cited "A 1952 (several years prior to
    initial U.S. interest in LSD-25) report that the Soviets purchased a large quantity of
    LSD-25 from the Sandoz Company in 1951, reputed to be sufficient for 50 million
    doses." (Ibid., p. 16.)
 
 Generally accepted Soviet methods and counterintelligence concerns were also strong
    motivating factors in the initiation of this research:
 
 "A primary justification for field experimentation in intelligence with EA 1729 is
    the counter-intelligence or defense implication. We know that the enemy philosophy
    condones any kind of coercion or violence for intelligence purposes. There is proof that
    his intelligence service has used drugs in the past. There is strong evidence of keen
    interest in EA 1729 by him. If for no other purpose than to know what to expect from enemy
    intelligence use of the material and to, thus, be prepared to counter it, field
    experimentation is justified. (Ibid, p. 34)
 
  
  
 -92-
 
 
 1. Scope of Testing
 
 Between 1955 and 1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical Corps to evaluate the
    potential for LSD as a chemical warfare incapacitating agent. In the course of this
    research, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American volunteers who then
    participated in a series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their
    ability to function as soldiers. With the exception of one set of tests at Fort Bragg,
    these and subsequent laboratory experiments to evaluate chemical warfare potential were
    conducted at the Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories, Edgewood, Maryland.
 
 In 1958 a new series of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood. These experiments
    were conducted as the initial phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 to evaluate the
    intelligence potential of LSD, and included LSD tests on 95 volunteers. [101] As part of
    these tests, three structured experiments were conducted:
 
 1. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a simulated social reception
    to volunteer subjects who were unaware of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they
    were participating;
 
 2. LSD was administered to volunteers who were subsequently polygraphed;
    and
 
 3. LSD was administered to volunteers who were then confined to
    "isolation chambers".
 
 These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity of the traditional
    security training all subjects had undergone in the face of unconventional, drug enhanced,
    interrogations.
 
 At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 in
    1960, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) authorized operational
    field testing of LSD. The first field tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special
    Purpose Team (SPT) during the period from May to August of 1961. These tests were known as
    Project THIRD CHANCE and involved eleven separate interrogations of ten subjects. None of
    the subjects were volunteers and none were aware that they were to receive LSD. All but
    one subject, a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of classified documents, were alleged
    to be foreign intelligence sources or agents. While interrogations of these individuals
    were only moderately successful, at least one subject (the U.S. soldier) exhibited
    symptoms of severe paranoia while under the influence of the drug.
 
 The second series of field tests, Project DERBY HAT, were conducted by an Army SPT in the
    Far East during the period from August to November of 1962. Seven subjects were
    interrogated under DERBY HAT, all of whom were foreign nationals either suspected of
    dealing in narcotics or implicated in foreign intelligence operations. The purpose of this
    second set of experiments was to collect additional data on the utility of LSD in field
    interrogations, and to evaluate any different effects the drug might have on
    "Orientals."
 
 
 
  [101] Inspector General of the Army Report. "Use of
    Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research," 3/10/76, p. 138.
 
  
  
 -93-
 
 
 2. Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agencies
 
 On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared a lengthy staff study on
    Material Testing Program EA 1729. The stated purpose of the staff study was: "to
    determine the desirability of EA 1729 on non-US subjects in selected actual operations
    under controlled conditions. [102] It was on the basis of this study that operational
    field tests were later conducted.
 
 After noting that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experiments with LSD on humans
    in 1955 and had administered the drug to over 1,000 volunteers, the "background"
    section of the study concluded:
 
 There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study of the prolific scientific
    literature on LSD-25 and personal communication between U.S. Army Chemical Corps personnel
    and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose an authenticated instance of
    irreversible change being produced in normal humans by the drug. [103]
 
 This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were inherent medical dangers
    in such experimentation. In the body of this same study it is noted that:
 
 The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially dangerous drug, whose
    pharmaceutical actions are not fully understood and there has been cited the possibility
    of the continuance of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic form, particularly if a
    latent schizophrenic were a subject, with consequent claim or representation against the
    U.S. Government. [104]
 
 An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by careful selection of subjects
    prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that the drug might be hazardous, the study
    continued:
 
 The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729 is an unproven hypothesis based
    on the characteristic effect of the material. While the added stress of a real situation
    may increase the probability of permanent adverse effect, the resulting risk is deemed
    to be slight by the medical research personnel of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.
    To prevent even such a slight risk, the proposed plan for field experimentation calls for
    overt, if possible, or contrived-through-ruse, if necessary, physical and mental
    examination of any real situation subject prior to employment of the subject. [105]
 
 This conclusion was drawn six years after one death had occurred which could be
    attributed, at least in part, to the effects of the very drug the Army was proposing to
    field test. The USAINTC staff, however, was apparently unaware of the circumstances
    surrounding Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the
 
 
 
  [102] USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program
    EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 4.
 
 [103] Ibid, p. 4.
 
 [104] Ibid, p. 25.
 
 [105] Ibid.
 
  
  
 -94-
 
 
 general lack of interagency communication on drug related research. As the October 1959
    study noted, "there has been no coordination with other intelligence agencies up to
    the present." [106]
 
 On December 7, 1959, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI, apparently
    a General Willems) was briefed on the proposed operational use of LSD by USAINTC Project
    Officer Jacobson, in preparation for Project THIRD CHANCE. General Willems expressed
    concern that the project had not been coordinated with the FBI and the CIA. He is quoted
    as saying "that if this project is going to be worth anything, it [LSD] should be
    used on higher types of non-U.S. subjects" in other words "staffers." He
    indicated this could be accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The summary of the
    briefing prepared by Major Mehovsky continues: "Of particular note is that ACSI did
    not direct coordination with CIA and the FBI but only mentioned it for consideration by
    the planners." [107]
 
 After the briefing, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels and Major Mehovsky met to
    discuss interagency cooperation with CIA and FBI. The group consensus was to postpone
    efforts toward coordination:
 
 Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with CIA we should have more factual
    findings from field experimentation with counterintelligence cases that will strengthen
    our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach red to by the conferees. [108]
 
 Had such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments might have been
    viewed differently and the tests themselves might have been seen as unnecessary.
 
 
 3. Subordination of Individual Rights to National Security Considerations
 
 Just as many of these experiments may have been unnecessary, the nature of the operational
    tests (polygraph-assisted interrogations of drugged suspects) reflects a basic disregard
    for the fundamental human rights of the subjects. The interrogation of an American soldier
    as part of the THIRD CHANCE 1961 tests is an example of this disregard.
 
 The "trip report" for Project THIRD CHANCE, dated September 6, 1961, recounts
    the circumstances surrounding and the results of the tests as follows:
 
 [The subject] was a U.S. soldier who had confessed to theft of classified documents.
    Conventional methods had failed to ascertain whether espionage intent was involved. A
    significant, new admission by subject that he told a fellow soldier of the theft while he
    still had the documents in his possession was obtained during the EA 1729 interrogation
    along with other variations of Subject's previous account. The interrogation results were
    deemed by the local operational authority satisfactory evidence of Subject's claim of
    innocence in regard to espionage intent. [109]
 
 
 
  [106] Ibid, p. 6
 [107] Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60, p. 1.
 [108] Ibid, p. 2.
 [109] SPT Trip Report, Operation THIRD CHANCE, 9/6/61, p. 5.
 
  
  
 -95-
 
 
 The subject apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and the interrogation, while
    productive, was difficult. The trip report concluded:
 
 (1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate a subject
    profitably throughout a highly sustained and almost incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.
 
 (2) The apparent value of bringing a subject into the EA 1729 situation
    in a highly stressed state was indicated.
 
 (3) The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the device of inviting
    the subject's attention to his EA 1729 influenced state and threatening to extend this
    state indefinitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to bring it to an end at
    the discretion of the interrogators was shown to be effective.
 
 (4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme paranoiac
    reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.
 
 (5) It was brought to attention by this case that where subject has
    undergone extended intensive interrogation prior to the EA 1729 episode and has persisted
    in a version repeatedly during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same version
    while under EA 1729 influence, however extreme the reaction, may not necessarily be
    evidence of truth but merely the ability to adhere to a well rehearsed story. [110]
 
 This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort this individual suffered
    were exploited by the use of traditional interrogation techniques. While there is no
    evidence that physical violence or torture were employed in connection with this
    interrogation, physical and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD CHANCE
    experiments to exploit the subjects' altered mental state, and to maximize the stress
    situation. Jacobson described these methods in his trip report:
 
 Stressing techniques employed included silent treatment before or after EA 1729
    administration, sustained conventional interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation,
    deprivation of food, drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation prior to EA
    1729 administration, hot-cold switches in approach, duress "pitches", verbal
    degradation and bodily discomfort, or dramatized threats to subject's life or mental
    health. [111]
 
 Another gross violation of an individual's fundamental rights occurred in September 1962
    as part of the Army's DERBY HAT tests in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent
    was given 6 micrograms of LSD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration of the drug
    was completed at 1035 that morning:
 
 At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready. He was placed in a supine
    position. He began groaning with expiration and became semicomatose. [112]
 
 
 
  [110] Ibid, pp. 17-18.
 [111] Ibid, p. 13.
 [112] "DERBY HAT" Medical and Pharmacological Report: Case #1,
    9/20/62, 1). p. D10-2.
 
  
  
 -96-
 
 
 For the next 28 minutes, the subject remained semicomatose.
 
 At 1148, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved.
 
 At 1155, he was helped to a sitting position.
 
 At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine position.
 
 At 1212, he was more alert and able to sit up with help.
 
 At 1220, Subject was assisted to the interrogation table.
 
 At 1230, he began moaning he wanted to die and usually ignored questions. Rarely he stated
    "he didn't know."
 
 At 1250, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently refocused his eyes with eyelid
    assistance. He frequently threw his head back with eyes closed.
 
 At 1330, he was slightly more alert. He was forced-walked for 5 minutes. He physically
    would cooperate until he became shocky again (sweating, thready pulse, pale). [113]
 
 For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same condition. Continued
    attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant answers. Six hours after receiving the drug,
    the subject began giving relevant answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours after the
    initial dosage, the subject was polygraphed. The interrogation continued for seventeen and
    one-half hours after the drug was administered.
 
 There was some psychological and medical screening of the individuals tested within the
    United States, in Europe, and in Asia. The proposal for the field experimentation in fact
    called for such examinations. The fact of prescreening did not eliminate tile risk of
    injury; the availability of medical staff did, however, limit injury and may well have
    prevented the death of one or more of the subjects. As the medical corps member of the
    team which surreptitiously administered the LSD noted, "one subject... did collapse
    after the interrogation and the presence of the medical officer was not only of value to
    the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus assured that an unnecessary
    untoward result would not occur." [115]
 
 In the October 15, 1959, USAINTC staff study, moral and legal ramifications of covert
    administration of LSD in field conditions were considered.
 
 It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic American principle of the
    dignity and welfare of the individual will not be violated. A more meticulous regard for
    the prohibition against violence or duress is taken in practice when the suspect is a US
    citizen or ally as against an actual or potential enemy, in peace as against war, and in
    respect to the nature of the crime.... In intelligence, the stakes involved and the
    interests of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical
    values, but not legal limits, through necessity. Any claim
 
 
 
  [113] Ibid., p. D10-3.
 
 [115] SPT Trip Report, Operation THIRD CHANCE, 7/25/61, p. 1.
 
  
  
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 against the US Government for alleged injury due to EA 1729 must be legally shown to have
    been due to the material. Proper security and appropriate operational techniques can
    protect the fact of employment of EA 1729. [116]
 
 On the basis of this evaluation, the study concluded that in view of "the stakes
    involved and the interests of national security," the proposed plan for field testing
    should be approved.
 
 The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects by the Army raises serious
    constitutional and legal issues. The consideration given these issues by the Army was
    wholly insufficient. The character of the Army's volunteer testing program and the
    possibility that drugs were simply substituted for other forms of violence or duress in
    field interrogations raises serious doubts as to whether national security imperatives
    were properly interpreted. The "consent" forms which each American volunteer
    signed prior to the administration of LSD are a case in point. These forms contained no
    mention of the medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they
    mention the nature of the psychotropic drug to be administered:
 
 The general nature of the experiments in which I have volunteered have been explained to
    me from the standpoint of possible hazards to my health. It is my understanding
    that the experiments are so designed, based on the results of animals and previous human
    experimentation, that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the
    experiment. I understand further that experiments will be so conducted as to avoid all
    unnecessary physical and medical suffering and injury, and that I will be at liberty to
    request that the experiments be terminated at any time if in my opinion I have reached
    the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiments becomes undesirable.
 
 I recognize that in the pursuit of certain experiments transitory discomfort may
    occur. I recognize, also, that under these circumstances, I must rely upon the
    skill and wisdom of the physician supervising the experiment to institute whatever
    medical or surgical measures are indicated. [Emphasis added.] [118]
 
 The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD in these forms raises
    serious doubts as to their validity. An "understanding... that the anticipated
    results will justify the performance of the experiment" without full knowledge of the
    nature of the experiment is an incomplete "understanding." Similarly, the nature
    of the experiment limited the ability of both the subject to request its request its
    termination and the experimenter to implement such a request. Finally, the euphemistic
    characterization of "transitory discomfort" and the agreement to "rely on
    the skill and wisdom of the physician" combine to conceal inherent risks in the
    experimentation and may be viewed as dissolving the experimenter of personal
    responsibility for damaging aftereffects. In summary, a "volunteer" program in
    which subjects are not fully informed of potential hazards to their persons is
    "volunteer" in name only.
 
 
 
  [116] USAINTC staff study, Material Testing Program EA
    1729," 10/15/59, p. 26.
 
 [118] Sample volunteer consent form.
 
  
  
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 This problem was compounded by the security statements signed by each volunteer before he
    participated in the testing. As part of this statement, potential subjects agreed that
    they would:
 
 ... not divulge or make available any information related to U.S. Army Intelligence Center
    interest or participation in the Department of the Army Medical Research Volunteer Program
    to any individual, nation, organization, business, association, or other group or entity,
    not officially authorized to receive such information.
 
 I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of this statement will render me
    liable to punishment under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. [119]
 
 Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing aftereffects of the test might have been
    unable to seek immediate medical assistance.
 
 This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is inexcusable. Further, the
    absence of any comprehensive long-term medical assistance for the subjects of these
    experiments is not only unscientific; it is also unprofessional.
 
 
 4. Lack of Normal Authorization and Supervision
 
 It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the Army's testing programs
    often operated under informal and nonroutine authorization. Potentially dangerous
    operations such as these testing programs are the very projects which ought to be subject
    to the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels of the military command structure.
    There are numerous examples of inadequate review, partial consideration, and incomplete
    approval in the administration of these programs.
 
 When the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in "field stations"
    was authorized in May 1955, the Arm violated its own procedures in obtaining approval.
    Under Army Chief of Staff Memorandum 385, such proposals were to be personally approved by
    the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was submitted to him on April 26, 1956, the
    Secretary issued no written authorization for the project, and there is no evidence that
    he either reviewed or approved the plan. Less than a month later, the Army Chief of Staff
    issued a memorandum authorizing the tests. [120]
 
 Subsequent testing of LSD under Material Testing Program EA 1729 operated generally under
    this authorization. When the plans for this testing were originally discussed in early
    1958 by officials of the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and representatives of
    the Chemical Warfare Center at Edgewood Arsenal, an informal proposal was formulated. This
    proposal was submitted to the Medical Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of
    the Army Intelligence Board on June 3, 1958. There is no evidence that the plan was
    approved at any level higher than the President of the Intelligence Board or the
    Commanding General of Edgewood. The approval at Edgewood appears to have been issued by
    the Commander's Adjutant. The Medical Research Laboratories did not submit the plan to the
    Surgeon General for approval (a standard procedure) because
 
 
 
  [119] Sample Volunteer Security Statement.
 
 [120] Inspector General of the Army Report, "Use of Volunteers in
    Chemical Agent Research," 3/10/76, p. 109.
 
  
  
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 the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted in May 1956. [121]
 
 The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were
    apparently approved by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General
    Willems) on December 7, 1960. [122] This verbal approval came in the course of a briefing
    on previous drug programs and on the planned field experimentation. There is no record of
    written approval being issued by the ACSI to authorize these specific projects until
    January 1961, and there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the
    Secretary of the Army.
 
 On February 4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI, forwarded a copy of the THIRD
    CHANCE Trip Report to Army Chief of Staff, General Earl Wheeler. [123] Wheeler had
    apparently requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through a General
    Hamlett. While this report included background on the origins of the LSD tests, it appears
    that General Wheeler may only have read the conclusion and recommendations. [124] The
    office memorandum accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler's initials. [125]
 
 
 5. Termination of Testing
 
 On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSIs office on the results of Projects
    THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both SPT's concluded that more field testing was required
    before LSD could be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interrogations.
    During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General Leonard (Deputy ACSI) directed
    that no further field testing be undertaken. [126] After this meeting the ACSI sent a
    letter to the Commanding General of the Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) requesting
    that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT and "make a net evaluation concerning the
    adoption of EA 1729 for future use as an effective and profitable aid in
    counterintelligence interrogations." [127] On the same day the ACSI requested that
    the CDC Commander revise regulation FM 30-17 to read in part:
 
 ... in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interrogations in counterintelligence
    or security operations without prior permission of the Department of the Army. Requests to
    use drugs as an investigative aid will be forwarded through intelligence channels to the
    ACSI, DA, for approval....
 
 Medical research has established that information obtained through the use of these drugs
    is unreliable and invalid....
 
 It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a prerequisite for use of such drugs
    because of the moral, legal, medical and political problems inherent in their use for
    intelligence purposes. [128]
 
 
 
  [121] Ibid, pp. 135, 137, 138.
 [122] Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60.
 [123] Memorandum from Leonard to Wheeler, 2/4/63.
 [124] SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett, 2/5/63.
 [125] Ibid.
 [126] Maj. F. Barnett, memorandum for the record, 8/12/63.
 [127] Yamaki memorandum for the record, 7/16/63.
 [128] Ibid.
 
  
  
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 The subsequent adoption of this regulation marked the effective termination of field
    testing of LSD by the Army.
 
 The official termination date of these testing Programs is rather unclear, but a later
    ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred in September of 1963. On the 19th of that
    month a meeting was held between Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis (Chemical
    Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General Deholm and Colonel Schmidt).
    "As a result of this conference a determination was made to suspend the program and
    any further activity pending a more profitable and suitable use." [129]
 
 
 
 D. Cooperation And Competition Among The Intelligence Community
    Agencies And Between These Agencies And Other Individuals And Institutions
 
 1. Relationships Among Agencies Within the Intelligence Community
 
 Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this area varied considerably over
    time, ranging from full cooperation to intense and wasteful competition. The early period
    was marked by a high degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence
    community. Although the military dominated research involving chemical and biological
    agents, the information developed was shared with the FBI and the CIA. But the spirit of
    cooperation did not continue. The failure by the military to share information apparently
    breached the spirit, if not the letter, of commands from above.
 
 As noted above, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence was briefed on the
    proposed operational testing of LSD under Project THIRD CHANCE, and expressed concern that
    the project had not been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request, no
    coordination was achieved between the Army and either of these agencies. Had such
    cooperation been forthcoming, this project may have been evaluated in a different light.
 
 The competition between the agencies in this area reached bizarre levels. A military
    officer told a CIA representative in confidence about the military's field testing of LSD
    in Europe under Project THIRD CHANCE, and the CIA promptly attempted to learn
    surreptitiously the nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time Mr. Helms
    argued to the DDCI that the unwitting testing program should be continued, as it
    contributed to the CIA's capability in the area and thus allowed the CIA "to restrain
    others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing
    operations. [130]
 
 The MKNAOMI program was also marked by a failure to share information. The Army Special
    Forces (the principal customer of the Special Operations Division at Fort Dietrick) and
    the CIA rather than attempting to coordinate their efforts promulgated different
    requirements which varied only slightly. This apparently resulted in some duplication of
    effort. In order to insure the security of CIA operations, the Agency would request
    materials from SOD for operational use without fully or accurately describing the
    operational requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's ability to assist the CIA.
 
 
 
  [129] Undated ASCI memorandum, p. 2.
 
 [130] Memorandum from the DDP to the DCI, 11/9/64, p. 2.
 
  
  
 -101-
 
 
 2. Relationship Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Foreign Liaison
    Services
 
 The subjects of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and biological agents abroad
    were generally being held for interrogation by foreign intelligence or security
    organizations. Although information about the use of drugs was generally withheld from
    these organizations, cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security of CIA
    interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American Government in a position
    of complicity in actions which violated the rights of the subjects, and which may have
    violated the laws of the country in which the experiments took place.
 
 Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in foreign countries was
    not limited to relationships with the intelligence or internal security organizations.
    Some MKULTRA research was conducted abroad. While this is, in itself, not a questionable
    practice, it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evade American
    laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTICHOKE memorandum in which it is
    noted that working with the scientists of a foreign country "might be very
    advantageous" since that government "permitted certain activities which were not
    permitted by the United States government (i.e., experiments on anthrax, etc.)."
    [131]
 
 
 3. The Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Other Agencies of
    the U.S. Government
 
 Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of intelligence agencies in
    this area. One form of assistance was to provide "cover" for research contracts
    let by intelligence agencies, in order to disguise intelligence community interest in
    chemical and biological agents.
 
 Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Although the CIA's project
    involving the surreptitious administration of LSD was conducted by Bureau of Narcotics
    personnel, there was no open connection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The
    Bureau was serving as a "cut-out" in order to make it difficult to trace Agency
    participation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA's ability to control the
    program. The Agency could not control the process by which subjects were selected and
    cultivated, and could not regulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CIA's
    Inspector General noted: "the handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests
    with the [Bureau of Narcotics] agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of critical
    results from the top CIA management is an inherent risk in these operations." [132]
    The arrangement also made it impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to
    end the surreptitious administration of LSD would be honored by the Bureau personnel.
 
 The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics was described as "informal." [133]
    The informality of the arrangement compounded the problem is aggravated by the fact that
    the 40 Committee has had vir-
 
 
 
  [131] ARTICHOKE Memorandum, 6/13/52.
 [132] IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963, p.14.
 [133] Ibid This was taken by one Agency official to mean that
    there would be no written contract and no formal mechanism for payment. (Eider, 12/18/75,
    p. 31.)
 
  
  
 -102-
 
 
 apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to ask for details, and the
    CIA's hesitation in volunteering information. These problems raise serious questions of
    command and control within the Bureau.
 
 
 4. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Other Institutions and
    Individuals, Public and Private
 
 The Inspector General's 1963 Survey of MKULTRA noted that "the research and
    development" phase was conducted through standing arrangements with "specialists
    in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and
    private research organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the
    institution the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each
    institution were "made witting of Agency sponsorship." The research and
    development phase was succeeded by a phase involving physicians, toxicologists, and other
    specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals and prisons, who are provided the
    products and findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensive testing on
    human subjects." [134]
 
 According to the Inspector General, the MKULTRA testing programs were "conducted
    under accepted scientific procedures... where health permits, test subjects are voluntary
    participants in the programs." [135] This was clearly not true in the project
    involving the surreptitious administration of LSD, which was marked by a complete lack of
    screening, medical supervision, opportunity to observe, or medical or psychological
    follow-up.
 
 The intelligence agencies allowed individual researchers to design their project.
    Experiments sponsored by these researchers (which included one where narcotics addicts
    were sent to Lexington, Kentucky, who were rewarded with the drug of their addiction in
    return for participation in experiments with LSD) call into question the decision by the
    agencies not to fix guidelines for the experiments.
 
 The MKULTRA research and development program raises other questions, as well. It is not
    clear whether individuals in prisons, mental, narcotics and general hospitals can provide
    "informed consent" to participation in experiments such as these. There is doubt
    as to whether institutions should be unwitting of the ultimate sponsor of research being
    done in their facilities. The nature of the arrangements also made it impossible for the
    individuals who were not aware of the sponsor of the research to exercise any choice about
    their participation based on the sponsoring organization.
 
 Although greater precautions are now being taken in research conducted on behalf of the
    intelligence community agencies, the dilemma of classification remains. The agencies
    obviously wished to conceal their interest in certain forms of in order to avoid
    stimulating interest in the same areas by hostile governments. In some cases today
    contractors or researchers wish to conceal their connection with these agencies. Yet the
    fact of classification prevents open discussion and debate upon which scholarly work
    depends.
 
 
 
  [134] Ibid p. 9.
 [135] Ibid p. 10.
 
  
  Appendix B: Documents
    Referring to Discovery of Additional MKULTRA Material
 
  Appendix C: Documents
    Referring to Subprojects
 
 
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